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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                      S. Josefsson
Request for Comments: 6339                                        SJD AB
Category: Standards Track                           L. Hornquist Astrand
ISSN: 2070-1721                                              Apple, Inc.
                                                             August 2011

 Context Token Encapsulate/Decapsulate and OID Comparison Functions for
  the Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API)

Abstract

   This document describes three abstract Generic Security Service
   Application Program Interface (GSS-API) interfaces used to
   encapsulate/decapsulate context tokens and compare OIDs.  This
   document also specifies C bindings for the abstract interfaces.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 6339.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Josefsson & Hornquist Astrand  Standards Track                  [Page 1]
RFC 6339 GSS-API Capsulate and OID Comparison August 2011 Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3. GSS_Encapsulate_token Call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.1. gss_encapsulate_token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. GSS_Decapsulate_token Call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.1. gss_decapsulate_token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. GSS_OID_equal Call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.1. gss_oid_equal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Test Vector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9.2. Informative Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1. Introduction The Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) [RFC 2743] is a framework that provides security services to applications using a variety of authentication mechanisms. There are widely implemented C bindings [RFC 2744] for the abstract interface. For initial context tokens, a mechanism-independent token format may be used (see Section 3.1 of [RFC 2743]). Some protocols, e.g., Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) GS2 [RFC 5801], need the ability to add and remove this token header, which contains some ASN.1 tags, a length, and the mechanism OID to and from context tokens. This document adds two GSS-API interfaces (GSS_Encapsulate_token and GSS_Decapsulate_token) so that GSS-API libraries can provide this functionality. Being able to compare OIDs is useful, for example, when validating that a negotiated mechanism matches the requested one. This document adds one GSS-API interface (GSS_OID_equal) for this purpose. Text from this specification can be used as implementation documentation, and for this reason, Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 should be considered code components. 2. Conventions Used in This Document The document uses terms from, and is structured in a similar way as, [RFC 2743] and [RFC 2744]. The normative reference to [RFC 5587] is for the C types "gss_const_buffer_t" and "gss_const_OID"; nothing else from that document is required to implement this document. Josefsson & Hornquist Astrand Standards Track [Page 2]
RFC 6339 GSS-API Capsulate and OID Comparison August 2011 3. GSS_Encapsulate_token Call Inputs: o input_token OCTET STRING -- buffer with token data to encapsulate o token_oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- object identifier of mechanism for the token Outputs: o major_status INTEGER o output_token OCTET STRING -- Encapsulated token data; caller must release with GSS_Release_buffer() Return major_status codes: o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that completion was successful and that output parameters hold correct information. o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that encapsulation failed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. GSS_Encapsulate_token() is used to add the mechanism-independent token header to GSS-API context token data. 3.1. gss_encapsulate_token OM_uint32 gss_encapsulate_token ( gss_const_buffer_t input_token, gss_const_OID token_oid, gss_buffer_t output_token) Purpose: Add the mechanism-independent token header to GSS-API context token data. Parameters: input_token buffer, opaque, read Buffer with GSS-API context token data. token_oid Object ID, read Object identifier of token. Josefsson & Hornquist Astrand Standards Track [Page 3]
RFC 6339 GSS-API Capsulate and OID Comparison August 2011 output_token buffer, opaque, modify Encapsulated token data; caller must release with gss_release_buffer(). Function values: GSS status codes GSS_S_COMPLETE Indicates that completion was successful and that output parameters hold correct information. GSS_S_FAILURE Indicates that encapsulation failed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. 4. GSS_Decapsulate_token Call Inputs: o input_token OCTET STRING -- buffer with token to decapsulate o token_oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- expected object identifier of token Outputs: o major_status INTEGER o output_token OCTET STRING -- Decapsulated token data; caller must release with GSS_Release_buffer() Return major_status codes: o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that completion was successful and that output parameters hold correct information. o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN means that the token failed consistency checks (e.g., OID mismatch or ASN.1 DER length errors). o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that decapsulation failed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. GSS_Decapsulate_token() is used to remove the mechanism-independent token header from an initial GSS-API context token. Josefsson & Hornquist Astrand Standards Track [Page 4]
RFC 6339 GSS-API Capsulate and OID Comparison August 2011 4.1. gss_decapsulate_token OM_uint32 gss_decapsulate_token ( gss_const_buffer_t input_token, gss_const_OID token_oid, gss_buffer_t output_token) Purpose: Remove the mechanism-independent token header from an initial GSS-API context token. Parameters: input_token buffer, opaque, read Buffer with GSS-API context token. token_oid Object ID, read Expected object identifier of token. output_token buffer, opaque, modify Decapsulated token data; caller must release with gss_release_buffer(). Function values: GSS status codes GSS_S_COMPLETE Indicates that completion was successful and that output parameters hold correct information. GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN Means that the token failed consistency checks (e.g., OID mismatch or ASN.1 DER length errors). GSS_S_FAILURE Indicates that decapsulation failed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. Josefsson & Hornquist Astrand Standards Track [Page 5]
RFC 6339 GSS-API Capsulate and OID Comparison August 2011 5. GSS_OID_equal Call Inputs: o first_oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- first object identifier to compare o second_oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- second object identifier to compare Return codes: o non-0 when neither OID is GSS_C_NO_OID and the two OIDs are equal. o 0 when the two OIDs are not identical or either OID is equal to GSS_C_NO_OID. GSS_OID_equal() is used to add compare two OIDs for equality. The value GSS_C_NO_OID will not match any OID, including GSS_C_NO_OID itself. 5.1. gss_oid_equal extern int gss_oid_equal ( gss_const_OID first_oid, gss_const_OID second_oid ) Purpose: Compare two OIDs for equality. The value GSS_C_NO_OID will not match any OID, including GSS_C_NO_OID itself. Parameters: first_oid Object ID, read First object identifier to compare. second_oid Object ID, read Second object identifier to compare. Function values: GSS status codes non-0 Neither OID is GSS_C_NO_OID, and the two OIDs are equal. 0 The two OIDs are not identical, or either OID is equal to GSS_C_NO_OID. Josefsson & Hornquist Astrand Standards Track [Page 6]
RFC 6339 GSS-API Capsulate and OID Comparison August 2011 6. Test Vector For the GSS_Encapsulate_token function, if the "input_token" buffer is the 3-byte octet sequence "foo" and the "token_oid" OID is 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2, which encoded corresponds to the 9-byte-long octet sequence (using C notation) "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02", the output should be the 16-byte-long octet sequence (again in C notation) "\x60\x0e\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02\x66\x6f\x6f". These values may also be used to test the GSS_Decapsulate_token interface. 7. Acknowledgements Greg Hudson pointed out the 'const' problem with the C bindings in earlier versions of this document, and Luke Howard suggested to resolve it by using the [RFC 5587] types. Stephen Farrell suggested several editorial improvements and the security consideration regarding absent security features of the encapsulation function. Chris Lonvick suggested some improvements. 8. Security Considerations The security considerations of the base GSS-API specification ([RFC 2743]) and the base C bindings ([RFC 2744]) are inherited. Encapsulation of data does not provide any kind of integrity or confidentiality. Implementations need to treat input as potentially untrustworthy for purposes of dereferencing memory objects to avoid security vulnerabilities. In particular, ASN.1 DER length fields are a common source of mistakes. 9. References 9.1. Normative References [RFC 2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000. [RFC 2744] Wray, J., "Generic Security Service API Version 2 : C-bindings", RFC 2744, January 2000. [RFC 5587] Williams, N., "Extended Generic Security Service Mechanism Inquiry APIs", RFC 5587, July 2009. Josefsson & Hornquist Astrand Standards Track [Page 7]
RFC 6339 GSS-API Capsulate and OID Comparison August 2011 9.2. Informative Reference [RFC 5801] Josefsson, S. and N. Williams, "Using Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Mechanisms in Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL): The GS2 Mechanism Family", RFC 5801, July 2010. Authors' Addresses Simon Josefsson SJD AB Hagagatan 24 Stockholm 113 47 SE EMail: simon@josefsson.org URI: http://josefsson.org/ Love Hornquist Astrand Apple, Inc. EMail: lha@apple.com Josefsson & Hornquist Astrand Standards Track [Page 8]